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Abstract
The view of business ethics that Christopher McMahon calls the “implicit morality of the market” and Joseph Heath calls
the “market failures approach” has received a significant amount of recent attention. The idea of this view is that we can
derive an ethics for market participants by thinking about the “point” of market activity, and asking what the world would
have to be like for this point to be realized. While this view has been much-discussed, it is still not well-understood. This
paper seeks to remedy this problem. I begin by showing, against some recent commentators, that McMahon’s view and
Heath’s view are fundamentally the same. Second, I clarify the sense of “efficiency” at work in the market failures approach.
Finally, I argue that, in its current form, this view has little relevance to the real world of business. I conclude by sketching
two ways of modifying it to fit our world.
Keywords Efficiency · Heath · Ideal theory · Market failures · McMahon
The view of business ethics that McMahon (1981, 2013)
calls the “implicit morality of the market” and Heath (2006,
2014) calls the “market failures approach” has received a
significant amount of recent attention (see, e.g., Jaworski
2014; Martin 2013; Néron 2016; Norman 2011; Silver 2016;
Singer 2018; Smith 2018; von Kriegstein 2016). The idea of
this view is that we can derive an ethics for market participants by thinking about the “point” of market activity, and
asking what the world would have to be like for this point to
be realized. While this view has been much-discussed, it is
still not well understood. The goal of this paper is to remedy
this problem. In doing so, I show that, in its current form, the
theory has little relevance to the real world.
I begin by arguing that McMahon’s and Heath’s views are
fundamentally the same: they share the same core features,
and it is not clear how, if at all, they differ. Heath’s view
has been described as “novel” and “new” (see, respectively,
Norman 2011; von Kriegstein 2016), but it is better seen
as a variation of McMahon’s view. Heath himself does not
conceal the connection between his view and McMahon’s,
but some of Heath’s interlocutors are less careful. It is worth
* Jeffrey Moriarty
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understanding the connection between Heath’s view and
McMahon’s view because, as we will see, they reach different conclusions about its implications. Next, I clarify the
concept of “efficiency” at work in the implicit morality of
the market/market failures approach. McMahon and (especially) Heath say they are appealing to the Pareto criteria,
but their use of this term is often looser, meaning something more like Kaldor–Hicks efficiency or aggregate welfare. This is not a mere terminological clarification but an
important feature that goes to the nature and plausibility of
their view. Finally I ask whether the implicit morality of the
market/market failures approach has any implications for the
real world. Most writers assume that it does, and that these
implications are clear (cf. Steinberg 2017). Both McMahon
and Heath are more circumspect. McMahon, in fact, calls
his view “an ‘ideal’ theory of business morality” with “only
indirect relevance in most actual business situations” (1981,
p. 256). Heath acknowledges the force of McMahon’s reasoning, but thinks that, with further argument, the view can
be made relevant for real economic agents. In this dispute, I
side with McMahon. It follows that, if we want a theory of
business ethics to tell us what real businesspeople ought to
do—and I think we do—we must look elsewhere. This does
not mean that we should consign the McMahon/Heath view
to the dustbin of business ethics. I conclude by sketching two
ways of modifying it to fit our world.
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The Implicit Morality of the Market View/
Market Failures Approach
In this section, I argue for my first point: that McMahon’s
implicit morality of the market and Heath’s market failures
approach to business ethics are fundamentally the same
view. I begin with McMahon, then consider Heath.
Before we begin, a reminder about scope. We are considering the content and implications of McMahon’s and
Heath’s view, not its justification. So we will consider
McMahon’s and Heath’s explications of their view but not
their arguments for it.1

McMahon on the Implicit Morality of the Market
McMahon’s summary of the implicit morality of the market
goes by quickly. He says:
The implicit morality of the market consists primarily
of the hypothetical imperatives which are generated by
economic theory when the achievement of economic
efficiency is taken as an end. Certain conditions must
be satisfied if a free-enterprise system is to allocate
resources to producers and distribute products to
consumers in a Pareto optimal way. And from these
conditions various requirements on the behavior of
economic agents—they might be called “efficiency
imperatives”—can be derived. (1981, p. 255)
This requires unpacking. First consider “economic efficiency.” McMahon defines “efficiency” in terms of Pareto
optimality, so an efficient outcome is one in which no one
can be made better off without at least one person being
made worse off. The reference to “economic theory” is a
reference to the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics. According to this theorem, perfectly competitive
markets at equilibrium yield Pareto optimal outcomes. In
a market, firms decide what to produce and how much to
charge for it, and individuals decide what and how much of
it to buy. In saying that market outcomes are Pareto optimal,
what is meant is: given a certain initial resource distribution among firms and individuals, people will trade with
each other in order to improve their positions until further
improvements are impossible. But markets yield Pareto optimal outcomes only when certain conditions are met. These
are the conditions of “perfect competition” and include
conditions such as no market power, perfect information,
homogenous products, frictionless movement of factors of

1
Both give teleological arguments. Economic agents are justified in following the implicit morality of the market/market failures
approach, McMahon and Heath say, because of the value of the outcome that obtains when they do.
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production, and no barriers to entry or exit. These conditions
are the source of the “hypothetical imperatives” McMahon
refers to in the above passage. From these conditions, he
says, “various requirements on the behavior of economic
agents… can be derived” (1981, p. 255). Put another way,
we can “read off” what economic agents should do from the
conditions of perfect competition.
McMahon cites “conspiracy in restraint of trade” as an
example. “The potential for economic efficiency associated
with a free-enterprise system cannot be fully realized,” he
says, “if economic agents create or maintain… monopolistic
or oligopolistic practices” (1981, p. 255). So the implicit
morality of the market prohibits agents from engaging in
these practices. Another example McMahon gives concerns
information. Markets achieve Pareto optimal outcomes only
if agents have perfect information. As a result, the implicit
morality of the market contains “various requirements”
regarding information. First, market participants should not
lie about “the nature or quality of what is sold.” Second, they
should not attempt to deceive trading partners “by methods
other than lying, such as deceptive packaging of products”
(1981, p. 257). Third, they should not exploit “the ignorance of those who are misinformed” (1981, p. 257). Instead,
they “must… correct any mistaken beliefs which those with
whom [they deal] may have about the properties or market
value of what is being exchanged” (1981, p. 257). Similar
results can be derived for the other conditions of perfect
competition.2

Heath on the Market Failures Approach
Like McMahon, Heath says that the purpose of markets is
the achievement of an efficient allocation of resources. As
Heath says, “the central rationale for having private profitseeking firms is to establish competition among suppliers
and consumers. This competition drives prices toward market-clearing levels, allowing society… to generate a more
efficient allocation of its resources and labor time” (2013,
p. 31). Also like McMahon, Heath understands efficiency
in terms of Pareto optimality. The “Pareto principle,” he

2

The implicit morality of the market has implications for market
participants. As McMahon says, it is a set of “requirements on the
behavior of economic agents” (1981, p. 255). But it also has implications for other members of society. Legislators and regulators must
articulate and enforce the requirements for market participants, and
otherwise ensure that the conditions of perfect competition obtain.
To take but one example, governments must take steps to end pay
secrecy, which is a significant source of information asymmetry in
labor markets (Moriarty 2018). Moreover, when economic activity
conforming to these requirements produces harm to individuals—
e.g., when workers are laid off in an economic downturn—society
may owe it to them to ameliorate the harm—e.g., by sponsoring welfare or job training programs.
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says, “forms the normative core of… [the] ‘market failures’
approach to business ethics” (2013, p. 174). And finally like
McMahon, Heath identifies the conditions of perfect competition as providing a guide to ethical market conduct. In
particular, Heath says that market participants should not
violate, or take advantage of deviations from, the conditions of perfect competition. For example, firms should not
“[produce] pollution, or [sell] products with hidden quality
defects” (2013, p. 88). They should not lie, nor should they
engage in trades when they believe their trading partners
have materially false beliefs. Heath calls these behaviors
“nonpreferred,” by which he means ethically impermissible. These behaviors are incompatible with the conditions
of perfect competition. Instead, they generate market failure,
understood as an inefficient allocation of resources.3
Unlike McMahon, Heath identifies not just what market
participants should not do, but what they—or at least productive organizations—should do. They should compete in
the market by making new products, making their products
better, or selling them for less. Heath calls these behaviors
“preferred,” by which he means ethically permissible (2014,
p. 88).4 When the conditions of perfect competition are met,
Heath says, these “would be the only way[s] that firms could
compete with one another” (2014, p. 88).5
It might be thought that Heath’s specification of what
market participants should do (not just what they should
not do) represents a deviation from McMahon’s view. But
it is best seen as an elaboration of an idea that was latent in
McMahon. McMahon believes that firms should not create
or take advantage of market failures, including imperfect
information or market power. It follows that they cannot
compete with each other on this basis. Rather, they can only
compete through behaviors that are consistent with the conditions of perfect competition, viz. they should try to make
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their products cheaper or better, or they should try to make
new products.

How are These Views Different?
To recap, according to McMahon’s implicit morality of the
market, (a) the purpose of markets is to produce efficient,
in the sense of Pareto optimal, outcomes. Markets produce
these outcomes under certain conditions, viz. the conditions of perfect competition. (b) These conditions in turn
are the source of ethical rules for market participants. (c)
Market participants should not cause the conditions of perfect competition not to obtain, nor should they engage in
transactions when these conditions do not obtain.6 Heath’s
market failures approach accepts (a), (b), and (c). Given
this, we can see the truth of Heath’s claim that McMahon’s
implicit morality of the market forms the “normative core”
of Heath’s own market failures approach.
We might think at this point that these are exactly the
same views. What’s the difference? Heath supplies an
answer. He describes McMahon’s view that efficiency
imperatives can be derived from the conditions of perfect
competition as “not overly controversial.” Heath goes on:
“the claim that I want to make, the one that is controversial,
is that these ‘efficiency imperatives’ are pretty much all there
is to business ethics, at least with respect to market transactions” (2014, p. 174).
I do not think Heath is saying that the efficiency imperatives themselves are noncontroversial. These same imperatives are part of Heath’s market failures approach, and Heath
thinks that some of them are extremely demanding and
would be rejected by most business ethicists. This includes

6

3
For Heath, a market failure just is “a situation in which the competitive market fails to produce a Pareto efficient outcome” (2006,
p. 549).
4
What’s the connection between ethics and law on the MFA?
McMahon is not interested in this question, but Heath is. Heath’s
answer seems to be that ethics provides the foundation for law, but
not all parts of the MFA can be codified in law. Suppose that a prohibition on stealing is part of the MFA. We might turn this into a
law against stealing, enforced by the state. But suppose that a prohibition on marketing to children is also part of the MFA. This might
be impossible to translate into a formal law and/or have it enforced
by the state. So it might remain (merely) an ethical rule. Since “the
law is a somewhat blunt instrument… the deadweight losses imposed
through use of the legal mechanism can easily outweigh whatever
efficiency gains might have been achieved through the intervention.
This often makes legal regulation unfeasible or unwise” (2014, p. 89).
5
This is not quite right. A standard assumption of perfect competition is “homogenous products.” Since there is no product differentiation in a perfectly competitive market, there is no “competing on
quality.”

McMahon and Heath are not the only writers to articulate this
view. In a little-cited article, Holley derives an ethics for salespeople
from an efficiency-based justification of the market. Holley says that
the “primary justification for a market system is that it provides an
efficient procedure for meeting people’s needs and desires for goods
and services” (1986, p. 3). The reason this is so, according to Holley, is that “people will efficiently serve each other’s needs if they
are allowed to engage in voluntary exchanges” (1986, p. 4). However, for the exchanges people engage in to be truly voluntary, certain conditions must obtain. It must be the case that “[b]oth buyer and
seller understand what they are giving up and what they are receiving in return. Neither buyer nor seller is compelled to enter into the
exchange as a result of coercion, severely restricted alternatives, or
other constraints on the ability to choose. Both buyer and seller are
able at the time of exchange to make a rational judgment about its
costs and benefits” (1986, p. 4). According to Holley, the behavior of
salespeople must be adjusted in light of these conditions. Salespeople
should not deceive their customers, either by act (lying) or omission
(failure to disclose relevant information). “To behave in such ways is
to undermine the conditions which are presupposed in teleological
justifications of the market system” (1986, p. 5). For space reasons,
and because Holley’s view differs subtly from McMahon and Heath’s,
I do not include it in my analysis.
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the requirement not to engage in transactions when there is
asymmetric information. (To appreciate the demandingness
of this requirement, note that it would require, e.g., a hedge
fund manager to disclose everything she knows about the
financial health of a firm to potential buyers before selling
its stock.) Rather, Heath is saying that the idea that efficiency
imperatives can be derived from the conditions of perfect
competition is not overly controversial. What Heath thinks
is controversial is his claim that these efficiency imperatives are “pretty much all there is to business ethics, at least
with respect to market transactions.” The implication here is
that McMahon thinks that there is something more to business ethics than Heath does. Heath limits business ethics
to efficiency imperatives, and McMahon thinks that business ethics includes efficiency imperatives plus some other
principles.
Heath does not say what McMahon thinks the “more” is
to business ethics than efficiency imperatives. But a closer
look at McMahon (1981) reveals that he thinks that some
of the principles of “common morality”—like “respect for
employee autonomy” and “do no harm”—can override the
implicit morality of the market. Considerations of efficiency
might require that managers make decisions in the least
costly way possible, but respect for employee autonomy
might require giving employees “a voice in policy formation” (1981, p. 276). Considerations of efficiency might
require the totally free movement of factors of production,
including labor. Employees should be permitted to leave
employers on a moment’s notice, and employers should be
permitted to “leave” (by firing) their employees, also on
a moment’s notice. But common morality might require
employers to soften the blow by giving workers warning
when layoffs are coming (see also McMahon 2013, p. 133).
So Heath is correct that, for McMahon, doing the right
thing in the context of business is about more than just complying with the market’s efficiency imperatives. It requires
taking common morality into consideration. But Heath himself does not say that doing the right thing in the context of
business is only about complying with efficiency imperatives. He says efficiency imperatives are “pretty much” all
there is to business ethics, not all there is to business ethics simpliciter. Unfortunately, Heath does not explain the
“pretty much” qualifier. So for all we know, Heath might
endorse McMahon’s exact position. He could say that efficiency imperatives are most of business ethics, but the principles of what McMahon calls “common morality” can also
be taken into consideration.
Let sum up. McMahon’s implicit morality of the market
view and Heath’s market failures approach share the idea
that the correct ethics for business will include “efficiency
imperatives,” or ethical rules that derive from the conditions
of perfect competition. Where they might disagree is about
what else business ethics requires. McMahon is clear that
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business ethics will take into account common morality in
some cases. Heath suggests that business ethics may take
into account some principles besides the MFA’s efficiency
imperatives, but does not say which ones. Based on what
these authors have said, we cannot say whether these views
are mostly the same or exactly the same. But they are certainly very similar and could be exactly the same.7
Below I will inquire into the practical relevance of the
efficiency imperatives that are common to the implicit
morality of the market and the market failures view. But
for convenience I will choose a single nomenclature, and I
will choose Heath’s. So I will refer to these as the efficiency
imperatives of the market failures approach, or the MFA’s
efficiency imperatives. This choice makes sense because
Heath’s terminology dominates the literature. But we should
keep in mind that these same efficiency imperatives are
found in McMahon.

Does the MFA have any Implications
for the Real World?
Having sketched the MFA, my next question is: what are its
implications for real people? This might seem like a silly
question. Haven’t we just seen what the MFA’s implications
are? Firms shouldn’t engage in price-fixing or other forms
of collusion, they shouldn’t deceive customers, and so on.
But in fact, McMahon and Heath both believe that the ethical
rules generated by the MFA are not straightforwardly applicable—or not applicable at all—to the actual business world.
McMahon is explicit about this. He says that the MFA is
an account of the duties of market participants “in an optimally functioning free-enterprise system—that is, under the
ideal conditions assumed by the theory of the firm and general equilibrium theory” (1981, p. 256, emphasis in original).
Since these ideal conditions do not obtain in the real world,
McMahon says, “any conclusions which an investigation of
this sort might reach would be of only indirect relevance
in most actual business situations” (1981, p. 256). Heath
agrees, to an extent (though as we will see he ultimately
tries to rescue the MFA’s efficiency imperatives from mere
ideality). He says: “we cannot use the [first fundamental
7

I have suggested that the strong similarity between Heath’s view
and McMahon’s has not been appreciated by many recent commentators. I offer two reasons for this. First, when Heath introduced his theory in his 2006 article, “Business Ethics Without Stakeholders,” he
did not reference McMahon’s work. His references to McMahon only
come later, in (what I think is) the definitive statement of his view in
his 2014 book Morality, Competition, and the Firm. Second, Heath
does not use McMahon’s terminology; he gives his view a different
name. It is possible, as I mentioned, that it is sufficiently different that
it deserves a different name. But it is also possible that it is not sufficiently different, and should go by the same name.
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theorem of welfare economics] to derive normative conclusions under real-world circumstances” (2014, p. 40). The
first fundamental theorem tells us what economic agents
ought to do when conditions are perfect, but not when conditions are imperfect, which in the real world, they always are.
Why does McMahon think that the MFA’s efficiency
imperatives do not apply to economic agents in the real
world? He explains as follows: “Results in the ‘theory of
the second best’ seem to show that a set of efficiency imperatives for economic agents in the suboptimal conditions
which actually obtain will not soon be found. The principal
result in this area of welfare economics is a proof that partial
satisfaction of the marginal conditions for a Paretian optimum will not necessarily result in increased welfare” (1981,
p. 256). Heath gives the same explanation. He says that the
problem with applying the MFA’s efficiency imperatives
directly to the real world “arises from what is known as the
‘general theory of the second best’… [which] shows that in
a situation in which one of the Pareto conditions is violated,
respect for all of the other Pareto conditions will generate an
outcome that is less efficient than some other outcome that
could be obtained by violating one or more of the remaining
conditions” (2013, p. 39).
These claims require explanation. We know that, under
conditions of perfect competition, markets produce efficient
outcomes. But now suppose that the conditions of perfect
competition do not obtain. Indeed, suppose—as is often
the case—that the market contains multiple imperfections.
The theory of the second best says that we do not get closer
and closer to an efficient outcome by eliminating more and
more imperfections (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956).8 Indeed,
we might get closer to an efficient outcome by adding a new
imperfection than by eliminating an existing imperfection.
An example will make this clearer. Suppose that the government subsidizes the production of natural gas, oil, and
coal. These are market imperfections that encourage the
overconsumption of these fuels, compared to other fuels
such as solar power. The theory of the second best says that
it might be better, from the point of view of efficiency, for
the government to start subsidizing the production of solar
power than for it to eliminate one of its existing subsidies
for natural gas, oil, or coal.
McMahon and Heath take this result to imply that the
MFA’s efficiency imperatives do not apply to economic
agents in the real world. This means, I suggest, that they
are thinking as follows. The MFA’s efficiency imperatives
are justified when and because they lead to efficient outcomes. Compliance with these imperatives leads to efficient

8
Following McMahon and Heath, here I use the term ‘efficiency’
loosely, not in the strict sense of Pareto optimality. I explain this
looseness in the next section.
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outcomes in a perfectly competitive market. But compliance with them does not necessarily lead to efficient outcomes in an imperfect market. So they are not justified in
an imperfect market. One of the MFA’s efficiency imperatives, according to Heath, is “do not seek tariffs or other
protectionist measures” (2014, p. 37). This is justified in a
perfectly competitive market because introducing a tariff in
such a market creates an imperfection, making the market
less efficient. But in an imperfect market—for example, in
a market with multiple tariffs already in place—this is not
necessarily the case. As Heath says: “if there is even one
trade barrier or tariff in place, then minimizing the number
of tariffs will not necessarily produce the best outcome—we
may be better off imposing some additional tariffs” (2014,
p. 40). The MFA’s efficiency imperatives are for ideal, not
real, economic agents.
As noted, McMahon, stops at this point. He calls his view
“an ‘ideal’ theory of business morality” with “only indirect
relevance in most actual business situations” (1981, p. 256).
Heath, however, is not satisfied with this result. While agreeing that one cannot simply “read-off” ethical rules for real
economic agents from the conditions of perfect competition,
Heath thinks that, with additional argument, the MFA’s efficiency imperatives “could be justified in some form” (2014,
p. 41). I will return to this claim below. But here it is necessary to say something about the notion of efficiency that is
now being used in the MFA, especially in the appeal to the
theory of the second best.

Efficiency: Pareto Optimality or Something
Else?
In their discussion of the relevance of the second best theorem for the MFA, McMahon and Heath slide from using
“efficiency” in the strict sense of Pareto optimality to using
it in a looser sense. This is an important change which merits
our attention.
The first fundamental theorem of welfare economics says
that, under conditions of perfect competition, markets produce efficient outcomes. Here efficiency means Pareto optimality. This is the definition of “efficiency” assumed in the
mathematical proof of this theorem (Mas-Colell et al. 1995).
According to McMahon and Heath, the theory of the second
best says that in a market with many imperfections, we do
not get closer and closer to an efficient outcome by eliminating more and more imperfections. We might get a more
efficient outcome by adding an imperfection (e.g., a tariff)
into the market than by eliminating an existing imperfection. In the previous two sentences, “efficient” cannot mean
Pareto optimality in the strict sense. It must mean something
like Kaldor–Hicks efficient or aggregate-welfare-enhancing. This is because a more efficient outcome—a Pareto
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improvement—is one in which at least one person is made
better off and no one is made worse off. But almost any
policy change, such as the introduction of a tariff, will create
winners and losers.
Consider again the market with government subsidies for
the production of natural gas, oil, and coal. Call this outcome
O1. The theory of the second best, according to McMahon
and Heath, says that we might get a more efficient result if
we add an additional imperfection—e.g., a subsidy for solar
power—than if we eliminate one of the existing subsidies for
a fossil fuel. Suppose we do add a subsidy for solar power.
Call this new outcome O2. O2 will almost certainly not be a
Pareto improvement over O1. This is because, while a subsidy for solar power may benefit many people (e.g., producers of solar panels, people who live in places with poor air
quality), it will hurt some others (e.g., oil companies). Yet
O2 might be a Kaldor–Hicks improvement, or an improvement in aggregate welfare, compared to O1. A move from
one distribution to another is a Kaldor–Hicks improvement,
or an improvement in Kaldor–Hicks efficiency, if those who
are better off in the new outcome could compensate those
who are worse off in the new outcome and still be better off.
(The winners don’t actually have to compensate the losers
for it to be a Kaldor–Hicks improvement. It just has to be
the case that they could do so and still be better off.) If we
understand “better off” and “worse off” in these claims in
terms of welfare, then a Kaldor–Hicks improvement is an
improvement in aggregate welfare.9
The point can also be made this way. In the real world,
almost any distribution is Pareto optimal. For almost any
move away from it is going to make someone worse off, even
if it makes a lot of people better off, and makes those people
much better off. But we can still compare the efficiency—in
a different sense—of two states of affairs in the real world,
both of which are Pareto optimal. We can compare them in
terms of Kaldor–Hicks efficiency or aggregate welfare.
In fact, McMahon and Heath understand this, though it
does not always come through clearly. Recall that McMahon
says that the theory of the second best tells us that “partial
satisfaction of the marginal conditions for a Paretian optimum will not necessarily result in increased welfare” (1981,
p. 256, emphasis added). McMahon realizes that partial satisfaction of these conditions may result in a Pareto optimal
state of affairs. For, as we said, all or almost all states of
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affairs in the real world are Pareto optimal in the strict sense.
But, as he says, this state of affairs may still be worse than
a more complete satisfaction of these conditions in terms of
welfare.10 Heath also understands that we have moved away
from Pareto optimality in the strict sense when we begin to
talk about “efficient outcomes” under conditions of imperfect competition. Heath says that the justification of the market is that “a well-structured, competitive market economy
produces not just utilitarian gains (where some might benefit
while others lose), but Pareto improvements (where everyone benefits).” He goes on: “Naturally this Paretianism must
be hedged and qualified in numerous ways, in recognition of
the fact that any action that affects a sufficiently large number of people is bound to produce both winners and losers”
(2014, p. 197). Elsewhere Heath speaks of a commitment to
“Pareto efficiency, modulated by a ‘realistic’ accommodation of the fact that literal Pareto improvements are few and
far between” (2014, p. 198).
It is confusing, I submit, for McMahon and (especially)
Heath to use the language of Pareto efficiency. If our “Paretianism” is, as Heath says, “hedged and qualified in numerous ways,” then it is no longer really Paretianism. If we concede, as we should, that “literal Pareto improvements are few
and far between,” and we “modulate” our understanding of
Pareto efficiency to accommodate this fact, then we are no
longer really talking about Pareto efficiency. The continued
use of the Pareto terminology would be understandable if
alternatives were not available. But they are. We can compare outcomes in terms of Kaldor–Hicks efficiency or aggregate welfare. And in reality this is what McMahon and Heath
are doing. Their terminology should reflect that.
The foregoing might seem like a minor and maybe even
pedantic clarification of terminology but in fact it has
important consequences for an evaluation of the MFA. As
we noted, the MFA’s efficiency imperatives appear to be
justified by their contribution to certain outcomes. When
these imperatives are followed, at least under certain conditions, then an efficient outcome is achieved. But then we
must ask: what’s so important about an efficient outcome?
If it is said “that outcome is Pareto optimal,” then that is not
a very compelling answer. All or almost all actual outcomes
are Pareto optimal, since given these outcomes it will often
be impossible to make anyone better off without making at

10
9

Suppose that in outcome O3 P has 10 units of welfare and Q has 15
units of welfare. In O4, P has 20 units and Q has 14. The move from
O3 to O4 is not a Pareto improvement, because Q is worse off in O4.
But it is a Kaldor–Hicks improvement, since (in principle) P could
compensate Q—by transferring some of her resources to Q—and still
be better off than she was in O3. Because P can do this, this means
that O4 has more aggregate welfare than O3. In our example, O4 has
34 units total, whereas O3 has 25.
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McMahon takes a similar position in his (2013). When introducing
the market failures approach, he defines ‘efficiency’ as Pareto optimality, which is how efficiency is understood in the first fundamental
theorem of welfare economics (p. 114). But he subsequently connects
efficiency with “social prosperity” (p. 117), which he defines as “the
enjoyment, by the members of a polity, of goods and services that
have been produced… with the polity’s own resources” (p. 133). This
is the looser sense of efficiency which I have said is Kaldor–Hicks
efficiency or aggregate welfare.
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least one person worse off. But if it is said “that outcome
is Kaldor–Hicks optimal” or “aggregate welfare is maximized in that outcome,” then that is a much more compelling
answer. It implies that that outcome is, along one dimension,
the best of a large set of possible outcomes.
To be clear, I am not pressing a criticism of the MFA’s
substance. It is a criticism, and more importantly, a clarification, of the terminology its proponents employ. Indeed,
this clarification should make the MFA more plausible. The
Pareto criteria are weak. Kaldor–Hicks and aggregate welfare are much stronger. If the MFA’s imperatives could be
shown to promote efficiency in these senses, then that would
be a powerful reason to comply with them.

Heath’s Attempt to Save the MFA’s Efficiency
Imperatives
We paused to examine the meaning of “efficiency” in the
MFA. Now let us return to the question of whether the
MFA’s efficiency imperatives apply in the ideal world only,
as McMahon believes, or in the real world as well, as Heath
believes. In this section, I examine Heath’s explanation
of why the MFA’s efficiency imperatives apply in the real
world, and argue that it doesn’t work.11 I quote at length
from Heath’s text, as his reasoning is subtle.

Heath’s Attempt
Heath says that the theory of the second best “does not mean
the efficiency standard is deprived of all normative force. It
simply means that we cannot make… big sweeping generalizations… Moral reasoning in a business context must be
a more contextual affair” (2014, p. 40). I take this to mean:
we cannot say that it is always correct—i.e., always conducive to efficiency—for businesspeople not to (e.g.) lobby
for special tax breaks or not to collude with each other.
Instead, whether it is permissible for businesspeople to do
these things is a “contextual affair.” That is, it depends on
the nature of the specific circumstances in which they find
themselves.
So far this is mostly just a statement of the problem that
we sketched in the previous section. The question is what the
MFA’s implications are, given this problem. But this statement also provides a clue as to how Heath wants to proceed.
He directs our attention away from universal principles for
market actors—the sorts of rules that the MFA yields for
11
Steinberg (2017) is a rare author who recognizes that the MFA’s
efficiency imperatives do not apply in the real world, for the reasons
outlined above. But Steinberg does not seem to see that Heath recognizes the problem and tries to rescue these imperatives, using arguments I discuss below.
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conditions of perfect competition—to the individual transactions that comprise “the market.” Heath observes:
Every voluntary exchange generates a Pareto improvement. It is through these tangible, incremental efficiency gains that the private market system has established its merit. Thus, instead of offering a “top-down”
justification of profit-seeking – through appeal to the
general equilibrium of the economy as a whole, one
could adopt a more bottom-up strategy, which would
appeal to the particular efficiency gains that the firm is
able to realize among its shareholders, its employees,
and its customers. (2014, p. 40)
Heath characterizes this as a “resource custodianship”
perspective of business ethics. He says “the ultimate goal
of the economy as a whole is to satisfy human needs,” so
we should think of “all productive resources as being ‘earmarked’ for the satisfaction of needs.” Thus, “whenever the
firm uses these resources in a way that does not contribute to welfare, but rather imposes deadweight losses on the
economy as a whole, it is acting as a poor custodian of these
resources” (2014, pp. 40–41).
Heath believes that, “using this sort of “‘bottom-up’ reasoning… all of [the MFA’s efficiency imperatives] could
be justified in some form” (2014, p. 41). This includes the
rules against deception and collusion, as well as the rules
against lobbying for tariffs and other sorts of governmental
protections. In this framework, Heath continues, “the Pareto
conditions would function as a set of heuristics, allowing us
to determine what type of conduct, in general, is likely to
constitute an illegitimate source of gain. However, actually
making the case requires a more detailed analysis, one that
examines the specific conditions of the market in question”
(2014, p. 41).12

12

Interestingly, while Heath thinks that the MFA’s efficiency imperatives do apply to real economic agents, he thinks that people are
sometimes excused from following them. He says that “[u]nder the
assumption of full compliance, any deviation from the deontology
prescribed by the market failures view is unethical” (2014, p. 202).
But “because of the competitiveness of the market economy, noncompliance by one firm can put very serious pressure on all of its competitors” not to comply (2014, p. 202). So if, for example, “all of one’s
competitors are exploiting a particular regulatory loophole, this does
not make it right to do so, but it may provide one with a reasonable
excuse for acting wrongly” (2014, p. 202; see also p. 37). According
to these passages, a person who exploits this type of loophole, or who
otherwise undermines the conditions of perfect competition, does
something wrong, but she is not to be blamed for doing it. This seems
to be Singer’s reading of Heath. Singer says that “much of what is
required by managers under the MFA still winds up being overly
demanding in the context of the actual conditions of the market economy” (2018, p. 50). Singer’s point is: given that it is too demanding,
managers are excused from doing what the MFA requires, though the
MFA is still what morality requires.
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Problems with Heath’s Attempt
I do not think Heath’s “bottom-up” reasoning can show that
the MFA’s efficiency imperatives are applicable in the real
world. This approach tells us to focus on individual transactions in a market. As Heath says, we should “appeal to the
particular efficiency gains that the firm is able to realize
among its shareholders, its employees, and its customers”
(2014, p. 40). Each of these transactions, he says, “generates a Pareto improvement.” This seems right. Under normal
circumstances, you would not engage in a voluntary transaction—a transaction that was free and informed—unless it
made you better off. But what follows about the MFA from
this?
You might think that Heath is saying is that, in the real
world, the MFA requires economic agents to make their trading partners better off. As a seller of a good or service, for
example, you do the right thing insofar as the person who
buys it is made better off.
That seems like a reasonable requirement. But I do not
see how it yields in the real world anything like the MFA’s
efficiency imperatives. In the real world, we can make our
trading partners better off through all kinds of activities that
run afoul of these imperatives. Suppose I engage in collusion
with another producer to fix the price of a good that we both
sell at a certain high level. Our collusive activity makes us,
the producers, better off. And the people who voluntarily
buy the good that we sell are also made better off. If they
were not, then they would not have bought the good. But the
MFA’s efficiency imperatives expressly prohibit collusion.
Or suppose I lobby successfully for a tariff on the goods
of a foreign competitor. Presumably the way I do this is by
persuading a politician that this is the right thing to do. I
might have to make a contribution to the politician’s reelection fund to gain access to her. When this “transaction” is
complete, the politician is no worse off, and may be better
off. And if people are still buying my goods at the higher
price I can now charge, then they are better off too. But the
MFA’s efficiency imperatives expressly prohibit this activity. The requirement to benefit your trading partner cannot
even justify the efficiency imperative prohibiting fraud. For
it may be possible to make your trading partner better off
through fraud—say if he is confused about the value of what
he is buying or if he is not thinking clearly about his own
interests.
Perhaps Heath would say at this point that I’m stuck at
the bottom. He is using bottom–up reasoning, so we have to
look at what the impact of a certain behavior (e.g., collusion,
lobbying, deception) would be not just on one’s trading partners, but on society as a whole. In support of this, Heath says
that “whenever the firm uses… resources in a way that does
not contribute to welfare, but rather imposes deadweight
losses on the economy as a whole, it is acting as a poor
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custodian of these resources” (2014, p. 41, emphasis added),
and is doing the wrong thing. Here the focus is on social
welfare, not individuals making trades. And it is plausible to
suppose that collusion among producers is generally worse
for society than competition among them. It is worse for
society as a whole if firms lobby for protective tariffs than
if they do not. And so on for the MFA’s other imperatives.
This response doesn’t work. Once we move “up” from
the bottom—i.e., we move from a consideration of whether
our trading partner is better off if we act in a certain way
to a consideration of whether society as a whole is better
off if everyone acts in that way—we confront the original
problem, viz. the problem of the second best. In a world in
which no one is lobbying for tariffs, then it is worse for the
economy as a whole if one firm does. But in the real world,
in which this behavior is common, then it is not necessarily
worse for the economy as a whole if one firm lobbies for
a tariff. It could well be better. So it is false that following
the MFA’s efficiency imperatives always leads to efficient
outcomes.
In fact, as we have seen, Heath acknowledges that this
is false. While the MFA prohibits seeking tariffs, he notes
that “if there is even one trade barrier or tariff in place,
then minimizing the number of tariffs will not necessarily
produce the best outcome—we may be better off imposing
some additional tariffs” (2014, p. 40). This means that complying with the MFA’s efficiency imperatives (in this case,
refraining from seeking a tariff) may not, in such a market,
lead to an efficient outcome. It is curious, then, that Heath
should claim that bottom-up reasoning, or indeed any kind
of reasoning, could show that compliance with the MFA’s
efficiency imperatives always leads to efficient outcomes.

Go Rule?
Perhaps this curiosity can be explained, however, as a misinterpretation. It might be argued that we should see Heath
as saying not that complying with the MFA’s efficiency
imperatives always leads to more efficient outcomes, but
that it usually leads to more efficient outcomes. Perhaps he
is saying that complying with the MFA’s efficiency imperatives leads to more efficient outcomes than complying with
any other set of ethical rules. And, Heath might further be
saying, market participants should comply with the MFA’s
efficiency imperatives even if, in a certain case, complying
with them does not lead to a more efficient outcome. This is
how rule consequentialism is typically understood. On this
view, it is wrong (e.g.) to kill innocent people, because a rule
which prohibits the killing of all innocent people has better
consequences than a rule which allows killing in some cases
(Hooker 2000). And this is so even if in an unusual case—
the sort of case that philosophers often highlight—killing
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an innocent person would have better consequences than
not killing him.
This line of reasoning is suggested by Heath’s claim that
the MFA’s efficiency imperatives should be understood as
heuristics for the real world, i.e., as determining “what type
of conduct, in general, is likely to constitute an illegitimate
source of gain” (2014, p. 41, emphasis added). Heath might
be suggesting that the MFA’s efficiency imperatives should
be understood as rules of thumb—as justified by the good
consequences they bring, compared to all other ethical rules
for business. And this is so even if, in unusual cases, complying with them does not produce efficient outcomes, i.e.,
even if acting in a different way would produce a more efficient outcome.
Is this claim true? Heath’s “bottom-up” reasoning does
not provide evidence that it is true. It simply provides a way
to think about the value of individual exchanges. And he provides no other evidence that it is true. So we must conclude
that it is unjustified.
This does not mean, of course, that it could not be true,
only that it has not now been proven to be true. How might
we go about determining whether the MFA’s efficiency
imperatives lead to more efficient results than any other set
of ethical rules for business? Not, I suggest, by philosophical
or economic theorizing on the “ground” level about individual transactions. We need empirical evidence from the
“top” level about policies, regulations, and practices. We
need evidence that, when people follow certain rules, certain results occur. As we search for evidence, we should
assess the MFA’s efficiency rules individually, not as a set.
We might find evidence that, when people follow the rule
requiring truth in advertising or the rule prohibiting collusion, people are in general better off. But we might not
find that rules requiring the elimination of all information
asymmetries make people better off. (A case in point: some
people—investment analysts, pharmaceutical companies,
market researchers—make a living discovering valuable
information. If they were required to disclose this information to their trading partners before engaging in a trade, then
they would have little incentive to discover the information
in the first place, and society would be worse off.) Our findings might be relative to all sorts of factors: industry type,
level of economic development, type of economic system,
and so on. Perhaps some evidence can be provided that
compliance with the MFA’s efficiency imperatives—one
of them, some of them, or all of them (some or all of the
time)—leads to efficient results, i.e., results that are more
efficient than any other imperatives. Or perhaps we will discover that compliance with a different set of rules produces
more efficient results.
Both McMahon and Heath believe that the MFA’s efficiency imperatives apply in an ideal world, i.e., to agents
under conditions of perfect competition. Our question in this
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section has been whether they also apply in the real world.
McMahon says “no”; Heath says “yes.” I have unpacked
Heath’s argument for “yes,” and argued that it fails. I also
identified what would need to be done to show that the
MFA’s efficiency imperatives apply to real economic agents.

The MFA as Merely Ideal
Our discussion to this point has left us with a theory of business ethics that applies in the ideal world only. It might now
be asked: is this a problem? Heath’s efforts to show that the
MFA’s efficiency imperatives apply in the real world suggests that he thinks it is. But perhaps he is wrong, and there
is no problem. This section explores this possibility.
The natural worry about an ideal theory of business ethics
is that such a theory would be pointless. McMahon, who is
satisfied with the MFA as an ideal theory of business ethics, resists this conclusion, saying “despite its descriptive
and predictive inadequacies, general equilibrium theory”—
the theory from which the MFA’s efficiency imperatives
derive—“provides a basic framework for comprehending
economic activity… Consequently if we wish to understand the place of morality in business, it is appropriate to
begin within the framework. The result can be considered
an ‘ideal’ theory of business morality, construction of which
is a necessary preliminary to work on a (possibly more relevant) ‘nonideal’ theory” (1981, p. 256). Here McMahon
borrows from Rawls (1971, 2001). Rawls offers his justice as
fairness as an ideal theory, i.e., one that makes certain idealizing or simplifying assumptions. “The reason for beginning
with ideal theory,” Rawls says, is that it provides “the only
basis for the systematic grasp of the more pressing problems” of nonideal theory (1971, p. 9). Similarly, McMahon
suggests that the construction of an ideal theory of business
ethics is a “necessary preliminary” to work on a nonideal
theory of business ethics for our imperfect circumstances.
Rawls’s claim that ideal theorizing is a necessary condition of nonideal theorizing is problematic. In his well-known
critique of Rawls, Sen argues that “investigation of different ways of advancing justice in a society…, or of reducing
manifest injustices that may exist, demands comparative
judgments about justice, for which the identification of fully
just social arrangements is neither necessary nor sufficient”
(2006, p. 217). In order to assess the heights of two nearby
mountains, Sen explains, we don’t need to know what the
tallest mountain in the world is, and knowing this information does not even help us to determine which of the two
nearby mountains is tallest. Similarly, Sen says, in order
to assess the relative justice of two arrangements, we don’t
need to know what ideal justice requires. And a “characterization of spotless justice does not entail any delineation
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whatever of how diverse departures from spotlessness can
be compared and ranked” (2006, p. 220).
This criticism can be easily adapted to the MFA understood as an ideal theory. We might conclude that an ideal
theory of business ethics is neither necessary nor sufficient
for figuring out how to make the business world more ethical. We can determine which of two alternatives is ethically
superior without knowing how agents in the ideal world
would behave, and knowing how ideal agents would behave
would not tell us which of these alternatives is ethically
superior.
Sen believes that we should do away with ideal theorizing
altogether. But others, such as Simmons (2010), believe that
this goes too far. True, if we want to climb the taller of two
nearby mountains, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to
know what the tallest mountain in the world is. But what if
we want to keep climbing taller and taller mountains? What
if we want ultimately to climb the tallest mountain in the
world? Then surely we need to know what the tallest mountain is. Simmons suggests that the search for justice is like
this. We should want not only to improve our present condition with respect to justice, but to keep improving it until it
is the best that it can be (see also Stemplowska and Swift
2012). To do this we need a target, which is provided by an
ideal theory. Something similar might be said in defense of
the MFA understood as an ideal theory. That is, it might be
said that we want not only to make business practice less
unethical than it now is, we want to keep reducing its unethicality. We want to make it the best that it can be. For this we
need a target, and the MFA provides one.
This response to Sen strikes me as correct, up to a point.
It seems correct to say, with Sen, that ideal theorizing is
not necessary for determining how to improve things in the
here and now (with respect to justice or business ethics).
And yet it seems correct to say, with Simmons, that there is
a point to ideal theorizing. It provides a target at which to
aim, and in doing so, helps us to determine which improvements are better than others. This conclusion may give some
hope to the defenders of the MFA understood as ideal theory.
But I do not think it should give them too much hope. This
is because, as I will now argue, the MFA is a highly ideal
theory.
In his theory of justice, Rawls makes two main idealizing assumptions. One is strict compliance. That is, Rawls
assumes that “(nearly) everyone strictly complies with, and
so abides by, the principles of justice” (2001, p. 13). The
second is favorable conditions. Rawls assumes that people
have the “economic means,” “education,” and various “skills
needed to run a democratic regime” (2001, p. 47). Among
other things, people are not faced with extreme resource
scarcity and are not deeply suspicious of each other. Rawls
insists that, in constructing a theory of justice on the basis of
these assumptions, he is not constructing a theory that is fit
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only for supernatural beings, the “saint or the hero” (1971,
p. 479). He says that his theory is “realistically utopian: it
probes the limits of the realistically practicable, that is, how
far in our world (given its laws and tendencies) a democratic
regime can attain complete realization of its appropriate
political values” (2001, p. 13).
By contrast, the MFA is not, I suggest, “realistically utopian.” It exceeds the limits of what is realistically practicable. Like justice as fairness, the MFA also makes assumptions about human behavior and social circumstances. With
respect to behavior, the MFA assumes, as does justice as
fairness, strict compliance. In particular, it assumes strict
compliance with the efficiency imperatives derived from the
conditions of perfect competition. This is implied by the
assumption of perfect competition. If some economic agents
do not comply with these imperatives (e.g., by deceiving
trading partners or engaging in collusion), then these conditions do not obtain. The MFA makes an additional behavioral assumption, viz. people seek to maximize their welfare in
the market (with producers trying maximize profits). There
are of course many examples of actual economic agents not
seeking to maximize their welfare in the market, but it seems
possible for them to do so. Where the MFA departs significantly from what is “realistically practicable” is in the social
circumstances it assumes. The MFA assumes that the conditions of perfect competition, including perfect information,
frictionless movement of factors of production, no barriers
to entry or exit, and no market power. These circumstances
are not simply hard to bring about; they are impossible to
bring about. There is nothing realistic about them.
In making these claims, I am not saying something that
economists—whose theories are also based on a model of
perfect competition—don’t know. They know that the real
world is not a world of perfect competition (Mas-Colell et al.
1995). Their explanations and predictions must allow for
the ways that the world is imperfect. Moreover, McMahon
and Heath are aware of the ways that the real world diverges
from the world of perfect competition. What they—or at
least McMahon, who is satisfied with the MFA understood
as an ideal theory—fail to see is the way that this challenges
the value of the ideal theory that they have constructed. Ideal
theory is useful when the idealizing assumptions do not take
us too far away from reality. But the idealizing assumptions
of the MFA take us very far away. Rawls’s justice as fairness is sometimes criticized for being too ideal. What we
have shown is that the MFA is a lot more ideal than Rawls’s
theory.
It might be replied that this is not a significant problem. Yes, it might be admitted, the MFA is more ideal than
Rawls’s theory, but this just means that more work must be
done to translate it into something usable for the real world.
We must be sensitive to even more ways that the real world
differs from the world assumed in the theory. In the next
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section, we will consider whether anything can be extracted
from the MFA for the real world. But I would just say now
that we are heading in the wrong direction. There is something odd, in my view, about constructing an ideal theory
of right behavior in an area of applied ethics. It is always
risky to say what a particular field of inquiry is “about.” But
I will take this risk and say that the field of applied ethics is
about describing the moral features of certain domains, with
a view toward telling actual people what they should do in
those domains. This is what most theories of business ethics
try to do. The MFA understood as an ideal theory does not
do that. It tells people living in a world that does not exist
what to do, and this world is far removed from our own. The
MFA may serve some purpose as ideal theory. It may not be
necessary to help us improve the current state of business
practice, but it may give us a target at which to aim. (I have
not said anything here about the value of hitting that target.)
But if this is all the MFA does, it is reasonable to question
the volume of attention that has been paid to it. Justifying
this attention would demand a re-conception of what the
field of business ethics is about.
We saw in the last section that Heath tries to show that
the MFA’s efficiency imperatives apply in the real world.
While it was wise to make this effort, it failed. This section
explored McMahon’s idea that the MFA has value as an
ideal theory. In response, we said that ideal theories have
some value, but the MFA is arguably too ideal—much more
so than the paradigmatic ideal theory, Rawls’s justice as fairness. And theories of applied ethics should tend toward the
real. As a result, we should be unsatisfied with the MFA as
a theory of business ethics until it can be shown to apply to
the real world.

Conclusion: Two Ways of Modifying the MFA
This paper is an effort to clarify a view that has been the
subject of much discussion, but which has not been properly
understood. I first sketched McMahon’s implicit morality of
the market and Heath’s market failures approach. I argued
that these are fundamentally the same view. Next I examined
the notion of “efficiency” at work in the MFA. While McMahon and (especially) Heath claim that they understand this
concept in terms of Pareto optimality, in practice they often
mean something closer to Kaldor–Hicks efficiency or aggregate welfare. Finally, and most importantly, I considered
whether the market failures approach has implications for
the real world. Against Heath but with McMahon, I argued
that it does not. All of these are significant clarifications
of the MFA and must be considered in any comprehensive
evaluation of this view. I went on to argue that a theory of
business ethics that is merely ideal is unsatisfactory.
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What’s next? As I said at the outset of this paper, it would
be a mistake to consign the MFA to the dustbin of business
ethics. To conclude, I sketch two ways of modifying it to fit
our world, highlighting the advantages and disadvantages
of each modification.
The MFA offers us a purpose of markets—the efficient
allocation of resources—and a set of imperatives—the
efficiency imperatives—that are designed to achieve this
purpose. In the real world, the purpose and the imperatives
come apart. Conforming our behavior to the imperatives may
not lead to the desired outcome; the desired outcome may be
achieved by behaving in different ways. Given this, it seems
that, if we want to fit the MFA to our world, we have two
options: privilege the purpose of markets or privilege the
efficiency imperatives.
Suppose, first, that we privilege the purpose of markets.
Then the MFA might be understood to say: the right thing
for market participants to do is whatever creates efficient
outcomes. On this modification, we would not need to discard the MFA’s efficiency imperatives right away. But they
would have no independent weight. At best they would serve
as placeholders until empirical research reveals the proper
rules for promoting efficient outcomes. An attractive feature of this modification is that it respects the justification
that McMahon and Heath give for the MFA: that it leads to
efficient outcomes. A drawback is that it eliminates what
was distinctive about the MFA: the efficiency imperatives it
derived from the conditions of perfect competition. In doing
so, it turns the MFA into a rather mundane form of consequentialism about business ethics.
The second option is to privilege the MFA’s efficiency
imperatives. Then MFA might be understood to say: the
right thing for market participants to do is to comply with
these imperatives. And this is so even if doing so will not
lead to efficient outcomes. Put another way, market participants should act as if markets were perfectly competitive.
An advantage of this approach is that it preserves the MFA’s
distinctive efficiency imperatives. The main drawback, of
course, is that the justification of these imperatives—that
they lead to efficient outcomes—goes away. The MFA would
be a set of rules without a justification for following them.
This is not the place to try to develop either possible modification of the MFA. Both seem worthy of development.
Until this happens, however, we must conclude that the MFA
does not tell us much about ethics in the actual business
world. This, I believe, is a surprising conclusion, and calls
into question the value of the market failures approach.
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